The author, then a Brigadier of the Pakistan Army, handled the Afghan bureau of Pakistan's spy agency, the ISI, during the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Coming from an ex-spy who worked with an organisation known for secrecy, his account is surprisingly detailed. Does it also tell us how the ISI might have attempted to handle its incursions into Kashmir?
The account is straightforward, a planner-trainer-soldier's version of a momentous effort lasting a decade. But one does detect attempts to give some elements a spin. For instance, it is hard to believe that the Soviets would have indulged in such indiscriminate scorched-earth bombing of the civilian population, a stratagem that could have achieved nothing but to pit the entire population against the Soviet Army. Surely, the Soviets understood as well as anyone else that no insurgency has ever been surmounted without people's support. Having said that, I must also admit - in contradiction to my own disbelief! - that the record of Pakistan's Army in Waziristan has been no different. So, perhaps there is enough room for making such obvious strategic errors.
The Soviets come across as less than competent, which is perhaps rather harsh. The Soviet soldier was poorly paid and kitted, tells the author, and a far cry from the resolute patriot that defended Leningrad. This was a war he did not identify with.
The mujahideen emerge as extraordinarily brave, capable of suffering unimaginable privations and steeped in vengefulness. They have also been portrayed as poor strategists and extremely fractious in their efforts. Indeed, it was the weight of their disunity that eventually prevented the fall of Kabul.
The CIA is painted as an agency focussed on ensuring that the Soviets were repaid for Vietnam - and eventually succeeded in that goal. They supplied billions of dollars worth of weapons and equipment, mostly purchased from other countries - including China - and eventually relented to supply a weapon that arguably triggered the Soviet withdrawal - the Stinger anti-aircraft missile. But the Americans too do not come unscathed at Mohammad Yousaf's hands; they lacked understanding of the ground realities, the author tells us.
General Zia also comes across as a scheming but small-minded leader who succumbed to US pressures and kicked the Director general of ISI General Akhtar upstairs when the Americans wanted him too, even though the moment was inopportune from the point of view of winning the war.
The two fascinating chapters in the book relate to the assassination of General Zia. The theory behind the plane crash is developed meticulously and while the author stops short of naming names, the finger is unerringly pointed at the KGB and KHAD combine, with help from within the Pakistan Army.
The other relates to the 'end' of the war. As the Soviets withdrew (under Gorbachev's tutelage, thus making him a darling of the West), it was in their interest to ensure that the mujahideen did not roll over the Communist regime of Najibullah and take over Kabul. Ironically, this was in the interest of the US too! They did not want a fundamentalist regime to assume power. They had driven the Soviets out and that was the end of their interest in the mujahideen. A speedy and smooth withdrawal of the Soviets was in their interest - that would ensure a 'victory'. The author claims that several factors magically combined to help the Americans and Soviets achieve these goals. The Director General of ISI who wanted it otherwise was replaced, the author retired, the successors were inclined to toe the US line, the huge 10000-ton arms and ammunition dump at Ojhri blew up thus choking replenishments for the mujahideen planning to launch attacks on the withdrawing Soviets and the mujahideen planned and executed a poor assault on Jalalabad, resulting in defeat at the hands of the Afghan Army.
A useful account!
